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The world faces – let us say – four great threats, and because nothing 
really changes, we know their names:  Pestilence, War, Famine, and Death.  
With modest modernization these categories can serve to guide our minds on a 
tour of the economic policy choices of the near and distant future. 
 
The First Horseman: Pestilence  
 
Pestilence is the most immediate of the threats.  As it unfolded over the 
course of 2020 and 2021, the Covid-19 pandemic raised, in sequence, two broad 
issues of political economy. The first of these separated the fragile from the 
robust, distinguishing those economies most prone to disruption from those best 
able to organize an effective response.  This was, in the main though not 
exclusively, a West-East divide. That is, it distinguished the disorganized, 
polarized, chaotic and largely ineffective response to the pandemic in the United 
States, the United Kingdom, much of continental Europe, and in most of Latin 
America from the disciplined strategies of suppression carried out in Korea, 
Vietnam, Hong Kong,  Taiwan, Singapore, and, on the grand scale, in the 
People's Republic of China – but also in Cuba, New Zealand and, for a time, in 
Slovakia.    
The advanced Western economies were (and are) largely bifurcated, with 
a small apex of globally dominant financial institutions and technology firms, 
above a vast substratum of personal services provision, complemented by 
residential and commercial construction. These proved to be highly vulnerable to 
a public health emergency, as business investment and construction demand 
collapsed, while all but essential services were obliged to close. The effect was 
instant mass unemployment, and a  collapse of world trade reverberating out 
across the entire world.  At the same time, the pandemic disclosed the very large 
capacity of Western populations (especially in North America) to adapt to home 
confinement, the reserve capacity of on-line commerce, and the ability of direct 
cash payments to ward off social collapse, particularly as there was never an 
absolute shortage of essential foods.     
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Meanwhile in the East, in the socialist world and in several better-
disciplined capitalist countries, economies centered on core manufacturing and 
practiced in epidemics took far more aggressive steps to confront the coronavirus 
head-on, using essentially conventional techniques of contagious disease 
control, namely immediate isolation of symptomatic cases supplemented by 
testing and quarantines, combined with lock-downs and universal compliance 
with mask mandates and other protective measures. In this way several of them 
largely or wholly suppressed the virus within a couple of months. 
These economies proved well-adapted to the emergency. While the 
pandemic developed, they were able to adjust their productive systems so as to 
provide the necessary gear – personal protective equipment, ventilators, hospital 
beds and even whole hospitals. When the virus was effectively contained, they 
were able to resume normal activity, largely by the fall of 2020.  For the price of 
social discipline and prior investment in public health infrastructure, geared to the 
threat of infectious diseases, these countries suffered small human casualties 
and only brief economic disruption. 
The second issue of political economy emerged with the development of 
effective vaccines. This was a signal success of the scientifically-advanced 
economies – the US, UK, the European Union with special reference to  
Germany,  and Russia. It reflects precisely the bifurcated structure of the most 
advanced economies – their scientific base and technological capacity being the 
strong element in their global economic role.  Thus, it was that the most rapid 
progress toward an effective vaccine occurred in precisely those societies that 
were least able to suppress the pandemic with measures of popular mobilization 
and social control.  The promise of a vaccine, to a degree, even served to 
mitigate the social stresses of the pandemic well before vaccines actually 
became available. 
Vaccines break the chain of transmission. They protect individuals while at 
the same time – or once distribution is sufficiently wide-spread – putting the 
pandemic as a whole on the path to extinction.   
The issues of political economy that vaccines pose are two-fold: 
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preparedness and distribution. Building and maintaining the research and 
reserve production capacity to meet a potential pandemic is a costly proposition 
that may be (and was) considered unprofitable by private pharmaceutical firms.  
And when vaccines appear, there is the question of distribution across countries 
and customers. And in privatized medical systems there is the associated 
question of the profits of the pharmaceutical companies holding patents and 
trade secrets in vaccine production. The system thus sets up, by its nature, an 
opposition between interests – between private profit and public welfare in 
matters of life and death.  
So a system of vaccine apartheid has emerged, with excess stocks 
accumulating in the hands of wealthy customers, such as the US and the EU, 
while at present writing Africa in particular has been able to vaccinate only about 
two percent of its population.  The disparity is not only in human suffering and 
economic disruption, it is also in the potential effectiveness of pandemic 
suppression. As the virus spreads it mutates, variants emerge, and the possibility 
that one may prove resistant to the present vaccines remains open.  Vaccine 
equity is thus a matter of global public safety, pitted against the corporate 
productive arrangements (in the US and UK cases) that produced the vaccines. 
And while the WTO has called for releasing vaccine patents, the EU is opposed, 
caught in the web of private interests that impeded vaccine development in the 
first place.  
This second issue is a North-South question. It turns on the moral 
acceptability and the long-term public health consequences of the patent system 
and what are called TRIPS – trade-related intellectual property rights.   The 
existence of a private, entrepreneurial system of pharmaceutical innovation and 
production presupposes a chase for innovation rents and therefore some legal 
protection thereof.  While it is evident that such rights should not prevail over 
human rights and global public health when millions of lives are at stake, it is not 
so obvious where exactly the line should be drawn.  Suspending patents and 
TRIPS is certainly the right thing to do in this case. It might be the right thing to 
do in all cases. But such an action presupposes moving to an entirely different 
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system – one that would treat global public health as a global public good, and 
mobilize the resources required as a matter of global public emergency. 
 
The Second Horseman: War 
 
The second horseman of the economic apocalypse is War – and not 
merely the all-encompassing threat of a nuclear ending for the human 
experiment.  The present preoccupation with preparations for war, and especially 
with building technical and material means for waging it, absorb many of the 
most advanced technical and human resources of which a society is capable, 
along with the decision-making bandwidth of its leadership. This is an ongoing 
economic danger irrespective of whether war ensues or not. 
The basic political economy of war is ages-old.  Conquest brings territory, 
resources, populations to be controlled and assimilated or killed off, and chances 
for pillage, profit, power and prestige.  These motivations held good up through 
the second World War, when the efforts of Germany, Japan and Italy to do what 
Britain, France, the US (and Germany, with less success) did routinely in the 
second half of the 19th century were rejected by what would become the United 
Nations.  In the aftermath, the empires of the victors had to go, and it was the 
singular misfortune of the two remaining superpowers, the USSR and the USA, 
to inherit custodianship of a world where military advantage had passed, 
decisively and permanently, over to the defensive.  Since that time, no neo-
colonial or neo-imperial military venture has paid off in long-term political terms, 
and certainly not as an economic venture.   
The reasons for this epochal change in the correlation of forces are no 
secret to professional military people.  I had occasion to list them, by invitation of 
the commanding general, to a symposium of the command of the US Army V 
Corps near Stuttgart, Germany in early 2005 as the Iraqi venture was turning 
sour.  The reception of colonels and generals present was, essentially, full 
agreement, combined with a kind of therapeutic pleasure at having obvious 
realities openly acknowledged. 
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First, urbanization.  The open country is the domain of maneuvers and 
firepower.  The city is a maze of constricted roadways, fronted by concrete and 
steel.  It can be subdued, against determined resistance, only by total 
destruction, as at Grozny, Mosul and Raqqa. 
Second, technology – and specifically explosives.  An invading and 
occupying army needs vehicles, preferably armored.  These are expensive.  The 
shaped charges and improvised explosive devices that can destroy them are 
effective, easily concealed, and remarkably cheap. 
Third, standards of conduct.  Atrocities are inevitable in wartime. But the 
capacity to subjugate an occupied people by means of terror, torture and 
massacre has been greatly diminished in our time by the Geneva conventions, 
by Nuremberg, and by changing norms in the media and on the home front; in 
particular changing notions of racial superiority, hence of human rights and the 
value of human life.  These constraints typically mean that atrocities are less 
systematic than they once were, and that whenever they occur, they tend to 
embolden rather than deter.  Genocide was once routine, but no modern army 
would today contemplate mass depopulation as a strategy. Even population 
exchange, delicately called “ethnic cleansing” as in the Balkans in the 1990s – 
has largely gone out of style. 
Fourth, rotation.  In the days of serious empire, the officer of the occupying 
army – and usually the associated civil administrators as well – were posted for 
extremely long periods, often for entire careers, returning home to the London 
suburbs or to Normandy only on retirement.  They were therefore quasi-
permanent fixtures of the local landscape, and among the natives whole careers 
could be built, in reasonable security, in their service.  Networks of trust and 
intelligence-sharing could develop and endure.  The one-year tour of duty, made 
possible by jet transport, presents the local population with an ever-changing, 
interchangeable group of personnel, who can rarely develop the knowledge and 
connections required to rule, and whose ultimate career objectives will be met 
back home or on some other assignment.  This effectively destroys that element 
of continuity and trust in the relationship between the occupier and the occupied, 
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making the infrastructure of conquest far more difficult – indeed practically 
impossible – to maintain. 
Fifth, impermanence.  Before 1941, a reasonable Vietnamese, Burmese, 
Algerian, Malay, Indian or Senegalese might have regarded the French or British 
presence as an indefinite if not actually permanent condition.  After 1945, in all 
cases except possibly Algeria, the writing was on the wall. And today, when any 
country undertakes a military venture beyond its own frontiers, the universal 
expectation is that in due time the occupation will end.  (Here, a possible 
exception is the West Bank.) Hence collaboration carries the inevitability of a 
reckoning at some point – and this is bad for imperial loyalties and morale, and 
therefore for effective colonial administration. 
With minor variations, each of these themes played a role in the failures of 
US military engagement in Iraq and in Afghanistan – as they had done in less 
comprehensive form a generation previously in Vietnam. Their generality is now 
quasi-absolute, and they leave hanging a large question.  If the most powerful 
long-range imperial force in the history of human combat could not prevail in 
those places, against some of the weakest military organizations of the modern 
world, then where – apart perhaps from Caribbean islets and the wastes of the 
Sahara – could it possibly prevail?  And this raises the further question, which is 
whether any useful purpose – imperial or otherwise – is actually served by a 
globe-spanning network of military bases, and by the vast deployment of talent 
and treasure required to build and maintain an arsenal of essentially worthless 
machines. 
There is some possibility that the generally stubborn and dim-witted US 
political establishment may be grasping this point. The exit from Afghanistan is 
nearly completed; that from Iraq, and likely therefore Syria, seems to be under 
discussion. According to General Mark Milley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, even President Trump's bellicose inner circle realized in late 2020 that any 
window for an effective attack on Iran had closed.  It does not appear that the US 
is about to confront Russia over Crimea or the Donbass.  And as for China – the 
very thought of a war with the world's largest army on Chinese home territory is 
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beyond absurd. At this juncture, the legitimate and feasible functions of the US 
military appear to be reduced to the following items:  a) anti-piracy patrols; b) 
humanitarian relief; and c) the Coast Guard.  For other countries, the military arts 
are basically vestigial at this point. 
Peace, in the large sense, at global scale, is therefore entirely possible.  
Or it would be, except for the flow of military contracts and the political 
consensus that keeps that flow going, irrespective of use or usefulness. But this 
too is a problem of political economy, and so a worthy challenge for political 
economists of the generation to come. 
 
The Third Horseman:  Climate Change 
 
Famine, these days, wears the costume of Climate Change, or to put it 
less obliquely, of irreversible runaway global warming, a phenomenon known to 
science and governments for at least sixty years but withheld, more or less, from 
the general public until the 1990s – far too late even then to prevent the 
catastrophes of wildfires, flooding and sea level rise now underway.   
Climate change is a comprehensive global threat, but it will likely take its 
ultimate toll, on most of humanity, in the concrete forms of  drought, 
desertification, salinity, soil depletion, disruption of trade and production, loss of 
water tables – and an eventual shortage of food.  People after all must generally 
eat every day. 
Actual famines will begin in countries with limited agriculture and over-
reliance on food imports.  For the wealthy countries, awash in subsidized grains, 
it is a ways off.  For the wealthy, its distant harbinger is food price inflation, 
particularly in the early stages for luxury meats, such as range-fed beef – high 
quality protein raised on semi-arid and otherwise marginal land.  As this process 
unfolds and extends to the long-distance transport of semi-tropical fruits and 
vegetables and other drought-sensitive comestibles, the principal impact in 
wealthy households will be psychological – a sense of loss, embedded in a 
retreat from a higher standard of living – combined with the vague discomfort 
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associated with knowledge that all over the world, in less-favored countries, 
people are hungry and, eventually, starving.   
In the poorer countries, food shortages, inflation and eventual famine will 
foster political upheaval, the collapse of public health, warfare and genocide: all 
four Horsemen, wrapped into one.   
 
The Fourth Horseman 
 
This brings us to the fourth horseman, Death himself, who comes for us all 
in due course, and who will, to an accelerated degree as time passes, deploy the 
vectors of pestilence, war and famine.  But there is another vector, death itself, 
inflicted on friends, family, lovers and one's own person – the routine litany of 
gunshots, alcohol and, especially, drug overdoses and mental-health disorders 
that accelerate as decline deepens and hope fades.  Thus, in a nutshell, the 
Apocalypse.  
 
Forestalling the Apocalypse 
 
It is characteristic of approaching apocalyptic moments that they are 
prophesied more than the prophesies are believed.  And even when the 
prophesies are accepted, the normal human reaction is lethargic rather than 
vigorous counter-action. Nevertheless, rarely has the world seen such a dramatic 
contrast between the consequences of action and inaction as in the years of the 
coronavirus, and perhaps never in human history has an impending global 
catastrophe been so reliably foreseen as with climate change.  So in the spirit of 
William of Orange – it is not necessary to hope in order to persevere – the 
political economist may nevertheless set forth a program of action. 
War is the feeblest of the four horsemen in present world conditions. It 
should be the easiest to dismount.  Absent significant territorial disputes or major 
questions about the integrity of frontiers, and given the shift in the balance of 
forces over to the defense alongside the rise, in Russia and China, of two 
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historically defense-oriented great powers, it follows that the military incubus on 
the world economy can, for the most part, in principle, be gotten rid of. This is 
true in particular of the nuclear forces, which can be cut back if not to zero then 
to the smallest number required for deterrence – a few dozen, say, in safe 
storage.  Likewise surface ships, jet fighters, long-range bombers, foreign bases 
– if they disappeared the world would not be less secure. And then the talent, 
material resources and organizational abilities currently absorbed by the military 
could be redeployed on other problems. 
Pestilence, too – we have learned – is manageable. We have seen what is 
possible in recent months.  Basic shoe-leather epidemiology works – social 
distancing, quarantines, isolation of the sick – if mobilized early and applied 
consistently with full resources and the cooperation of the people. The task here 
is the construction and reconstruction of societies capable of fast, effective 
action, equipped with productive resources and reserve capacity adequate to 
emergencies on the scale we have just seen.  Vaccines – we have seen – are 
feasible and they work. The task is to develop productive processes that can 
generate as well as distribute widely and quickly, irrespective of the ability to pay.  
The wealthy countries have solved the technical problem; the rest is political 
economy, though it is far from easy and may indeed prove less tractable than the 
science itself. 
Famine, which is to say global warming, is a far more dangerous problem, 
though the worst remains some decades off. It is dangerous in part precisely 
because action is needed now, with effort and sacrifices required, to avert 
horrors that will befall the next two generations and beyond. Three broad 
strategies are called for: decarbonization, mitigation and adaptation. 
Decarbonization is an engineering challenge – that of building and 
maintaining an energy system far less reliant on fossil fuels.  For the electric grid, 
this means scaling up renewables – solar and wind – and developing safer and 
more sustainable nuclear power.  From a resource-management perspective, 
this means diverting fossil fuels from inessential uses in the medium terms 
toward the construction and reconstruction project.  The most obvious of the 
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inessential consumers is the military.  But the world has learned that it can make 
do with far less air travel, less daily commuting, and fewer high-rise office 
buildings.  The information-carrying capacity of fiber-optics is vast and the 
economies of work-from-home are substantial.  Still, as a matter of resource 
physics the transition out of fossil fuels will require more to be used in the short 
run to build systems so that less will be needed later on. 
Beyond the engineering challenge is an economic problem: as renewable 
supplies increase, prices fall and the economics of the transition become difficult 
for private, profit-making enterprises. This is not a new problem; it exists for 
municipal waterworks and, apart from monopoly pricing power, for entities like 
Facebook, Google or Amazon, as well as for newspapers and other information 
media in the electronic age.  The remedy is socialization – not merely of the 
costs but also of the benefits. What is necessary but cannot be done for profit by 
the private sector should be taken up by the public and not-for-profit spheres. 
The unification of the electric grid into one planned entity, duly investing in 
generation, storage, distribution and duly allocating the final product. Here the 
same issues of fair allocation arise as for vaccines, public health clinics and other 
matters of basic necessity.  Again, this is a problem for the political economists of 
this generation and the next. 
Mitigation and adaptation are closely related, long-term challenges.  They 
include protecting what can be protected from sea level rise, and relocating what 
cannot be protected, this time in towns and cities of human scale, minimal energy 
waste and constructed to accommodate, so far as possible, the climate of the 
centuries ahead.  Obviously, this too means dipping once again into the fossil 
fuel reserve – concrete and steel require and emit carbon.  There is no magical 
exit from a calamity that humanity has been preparing for itself over three 
hundred years. 
With the long-term project in view, how best to organize social relations so 
as to achieve it?  Here the pandemic teaches that in wealthy societies the 
expedient of  writing checks – to taxpayers, to the unemployed, to companies – 
works wonderfully well in warding off disaster in the short run.  These are 
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conventionally termed “stimulus payments” but the phrase is a misnomer; in the 
real world they serve first to maintain previously essential living standards – food, 
fuel, rent – and second as a boost to savings, hence as a form of insurance 
against the economic hazards still ahead. 
For most adults of working age, money alone is not a satisfactory 
permanent solution.  Human beings need something to do.  A leisure class has 
existed since the dawn of agriculture and the appearance of the appropriable 
surplus, but the social consequences of the existence of this class – predatory, 
parasitical, competitive, self-absorbed – is at best a mixed blessing.  As 
technology reduces the demand for office workers and retail clerks, a decent 
pension is a reasonable offset for those who have already put in their time and 
reached a certain age.  It is not a good solution for the young and restless. 
What then is the way forward?  There is plenty to do.  There are people to 
do it.  The task is to bring them together, under good leadership and effective 
organization. The pandemic has also proved that there is no financial constraint 
per se – money is merely a claim, which can be created and allocted at will by a 
sovereign government.  The resulting claims show up as household saving, 
which can be drawn down over time and future production to deliver the goods 
(and services) at (reasonably) stable prices, supply conditions permitting.  By the 
same token – so to speak –  there is no economic reason why a job cannot be 
guaranteed, for everyone who wants one, at a decent but not extravagant real 
wage.1 Doing so has the added virtue of setting pay and labor standards that 
private employers must meet, or lose their workers.  It is true that some 
employers rely on having a strong upper hand over their workers, but it is entirely 
possible to grow and condition a new breed who will adapt.  The mid-twentieth 
century saw precisely this development, and for the most part got along quite 
well with it.   
With a job guarantee, a decent pension system, public health care, and 
stable housing, the advanced societies can forestall the challenge of precarity2 
and give their populations reason to show solidarity in the forthcoming collective 
effort toward ultimate survival.  This is a precondition, surely, for the mobilization 
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and sustained effort – combined with a certain degree of dislocation and material 
sacrifice, at best – that the circumstances are going to require. 
Still, once War has been dismounted and Pestilence bridled,  the physical 
and human resources no longer consumed by War, along with the social purpose 
learned by bringing Pestilence to heel, can be deployed against the prospect of 
Famine, with a better chance of success than would otherwise be the case. In 
this way Famine can perhaps be deferred and limited, if not tamed and altogether 
prevented. This is not a matter for false hopes, for delusions. It is not a matter to 
be left to markets, taxes, or permits. It is a matter for resolve, planning, 
organization, democratic mobilization, solidarity and common purpose. And 
these, perhaps, are the best tools against that fourth horseman, whose other 
name is Despair. 
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